The Effect Of LTO Culture On International Supply Chain Contracts by Ryu, Sungmin & Cook, Martha
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fall 2005                                                               Volume 21, Number 4 
 95 
The Effect Of LTO Culture 
On International Supply Chain Contracts 
Sungmin Ryu, (E-mail: sryu@suffolk .edu), Suffolk University 
Martha Cook, (E-Mail: Martha_Cook@Baruch.cuny.edu), Baruch College/City University of New York 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Effective management of international supply chain relationships is critical in determining the 
success of the ever-growing cadré of international businesses where small cost differentials 
separate profitable enterprises from failed ones.   Because inter-organizational contractual 
arrangements define expectations and standards for supply chain transactions, they may play a 
role in determining relationship efficiencies (and thus costs.)  Although the effect of culture on the 
functioning of interfirm relationships in the supply chain has been an active area of scholarly 
investigation in the past decade, most studies have focused on organizations in Western societies, 
particularly in the US and Europe.  Increasingly, global supply chains include at least one Asian 
partner so that cultural patterns predominant in the East must also be considered.  This study 
examines the cultural factor of time orientation and seeks to understand how the long-term 
orientation (LTO) characterizing many Eastern cultures may affect supply chain contracts.  
Specifically, it investigates the influence of cultural time-orientation on the formation of soft 
(implicit, general) and hard (written, detailed) contracts. The results underscore the importance of 
culture in managing effective interfirm relationships in the supply chain: Long-term orientation 
culture tends to rely upon and function successfully with soft contracts, but does not depends on 
hard contracts.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ecent scholarly attention to governance mechanisms in the area of organizational relationships in the 
supply chain has improved understanding of the contractual relationship between exchange parties. 
Scholars have identified important factors influencing contractual relationships: environmental 
uncertainty (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000), relationalism (Antia and Frazier 2001), purchasing volume (Buvik 
and Reve 2001), transaction specific investment (Antia and Frazier 2001; Buvik and Reve 2001; Cannon, Achrol, and 
Gundlach 2000), interdependence magnitude (Antia and Frazier 2001, Lusch and Brown 1996), and interdependence 
asymmetry (Antia and Frazier 2001; Etgar and Vanency 1983).   All of these have demonstrated effects on the nature 
of contractual relationships and on the measure of success they enjoy.    
 
There is a gap in this body of research:  The influence of culture, a macro factor, has not been examined with 
the same thoroughness. Comparative research analyzing the influence of culture on exchange parties’ behavior in 
different cultures has been rare (Chang & Ding 1995).  This limits the confidence with which one might generalize 
relationship characteristics when exchange parties from dissimilar cultures are studied (Doney & Cannon 1997).  As 
the global economy expands, exchange partners from the East and the West interact with increasing frequency.  
Surely, East-Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong might be expected to have 
interfirm relationships mirroring their socio-cultural orientation, just as Western firms reflect their cultural patterns as 
they transact business.  Greater understanding of cultural influence in channel relationships is, thus both overdue and 
important.  
 
The cultural dimension most likely to influence contractual patterns in the supply chain is that of long-term 
orientation (LTO)—Hofstede’s fifth dimension of national culture (Hofstede 1991.)   LTO refers to the cultural 
propensity to adopt a long term view of social (and business) interactions.  This orientation has been used by scholars 
R 
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to explain social interaction (e.g., Barkema & Vermeulen 1997; Newman and Nollen 1996; Hofstede 1991).  LTO, is 
the extent to which a society exhibits a pragmatic future-oriented perspective rather than a conventional short-term 
point of view (Mooij 1997). Interorganizational relationships in LTO cultures, once established, tend to endure over 
long periods.  Parties to these relationships tend to handle current issues with long-term goals rather than short-term 
gains in mind.  In contrast, exchange parties in cultures exhibiting low LTO tend to engage in relationships that are 
comparatively short-term and, in turn, to expect supply chain relationships to be relatively short-lived. Many 
industrialized Western countries are relatively low in LTO as measured by Hofstede (1991). 
 
The purpose of this study is to understand the effect of LTO culture on the contractual relationship between 
supply chain members. LTO culture has been confirmed at international levels (Nakata & Sivakumar 1996, Chang & 
Ding 1995, Yeh & Lawrence 1995) and has been accepted as important for describing difference among nations 
(Newman & Nollen 1996). However, since LTO as a national culture-characteristic is relatively new, no empirical 
research has been done on the impact of LTO on the contractual relationships in the supply chain.  In this study, we 
examine the effect of LTO culture on the characteristics of contracts in Korea, as an exemplar of a high LTO culture.  
The investigation of the influence of LTO may be helpful in understanding contractual relationships formed in a 
country with differing level of time orientation. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND & HYPOTHESES 
 
Long-Term Orientation(LTO) 
 
Most scholars (Ganasan 1994; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Lusch & Brown 1996) treat LTO at the individual firm 
level, rather than at the level of national culture. For example, Ganasan (1994) defines LTO as the perception of 
interdependence of outcomes in which both partner’s outcomes and joint outcomes are expected to be realized in the 
future.  Short-term accommodation is desirable to achieve the long term result.  LTO as used by these channel 
scholars is affected by antecedents such as trust and dependence between exchange parties (Ganasan 1994) and these 
in turn affect other relational variables such as cooperation (Morgan & Hunt 1994) and relational norms (Lusch & 
Brown 1996) among exchange parties.  However, LTO at the macro level of nation culture is a predisposition related 
to cultural formation.  Social relationships between exchange partners spring from the cultural milieus of the 
individual partners. If the embedded cultural orientation is a time orientation (either long or short-term), it is logical to 
assume that such an orientation may be important in shaping interfirm supply chain interactions. 
 
Members of East-Asian cultures such as Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong tend to understand 
social interactions in the context of the long-term. Their personal, social and business relationships are maintained and 
reinforced through continuous and long-term associations (Yeung & Tung, 1996). Both current problems and 
advantages are generally viewed in the context of outcomes expected in the distant future.  These countries foster 
virtues oriented towards future reward (as opposed to short-term gain) and this orientation is expressed as a high score 
on the LTO index (Hofstede 1991).  Discrete transactions are, for the Asian, generally viewed as part of the larger, 
more important whole of the on-going relationship. 
 
In the West, by contrast, social transactions of all types are more often seen as isolated occurrences.  The 
objective of any transaction is to achieve optimal ―give and take‖ in that particular transaction.  An emphasis is placed 
on immediate gains from the interaction (Yeung & Tung, 1996).  Countries in which citizens evidence these 
transaction-focused tendencies (such as the USA, the UK, and Canada) score low on the LTO index (Hofstede 1991).  
Jacobs (1991) argues that this short-term focus hampers US firms in the development of technologies and products 
necessary to compete on a global basis.  R&D by its very nature is a lengthy and often uncertain process and therefore 
antithetical to milieus where a high value is assigned to short-term outcomes.  This orientation may undermine the 
long-run viability of American companies.  Jacobs recommends that American companies adopt a longer-term 
perspective to compete successfully with Japan.  
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LTO Measures 
 
Hofstede (1991) suggests that, among several dimensions, perseverance and thrift reflect LTO most 
adequately. In the inter-organizational relationship context, these two dimensions appear to have particular relevance. 
 
Thrift:  Being thrifty means spending money carefully in the present for later enjoyment. It also means 
postponing present happiness to the future. Therefore, thriftiness for high LTO cultures represents an orientation 
towards the future (Yeh & Lawrence 1995). Hofstede (1991) points out that a high score on the value of thrift in 
Korea shows very long-term orientation in the culture.  
 
Perseverance:  Perseverance is a consistent and determined effort to achieve goals (Hofstede 1991).  Goals 
are future positions an exchange party wishes to attain and goals exist only if the desired position differs from the 
actual state (Cadotte & Stern 1979).  When an exchange party regards its goals as difficult to achieve, persistence is 
necessary since attainment cannot be imminent.  Persistence focuses on the long-term for payoff for present efforts.  
Thus, perseverance evidences a high level of long-term orientation.  Korea shows high scores on the value of 
perseverance (Hofstede 1991).   
 
Diverse Cultural Tendencies within a Culture 
 
Culture is learned and interpreted by its members. The behavior of each member is different depending on 
the level of learning or interpretation of the culture particular to that individual (Keesing 1974). Therefore, depending 
on individual’s level of acculturation, various degrees of cultural tendencies may be observed (Triandis et al 1985).  
Keesing (1974, p.89) asserted that ―each individual has a variant version of the code.  Culture in this view is ordered 
as a system shaped and constrained by the way the human brain acquires, organizes, and processes information.‖ 
Thus, as the individual accepts and reflects the culture around him/her, so will exchange parties tend to exhibit their 
culture as they interact with supply chain partners.  
 
Behavior deviating from a cultural norm is possible.  For instance, a party in a STO culture might not fully 
observe the expected short-term perspective on a supply contract, reflecting that the individual has not adopted this 
aspect of his/her ambient culture. Thus, Goodenough (1971) suggested that the analysis of cultural influence on 
behavior must be in individual level, since people learn culture as individuals.    
  
Contracts   
 
Contracts refer to the promise between exchange parties to project exchange into the future (Macneil 1980).  
Therefore, contracts shape or attempt to shape relationships in the future and they would not exist unless some 
expectation of future dealings existed.  Since exchange parties cannot predict the future perfectly, the content of 
contract may not reflect the future contingencies well.  Thus, contracts may make the parties vulnerable.  Either party 
may be vulnerable to the other if one tries to take advantage of unclear or missing contract terms (in other words, 
engages in opportunistic behavior.)  
 
In their explicit protection against possible opportunistic behavior, scholars have divided contracts into two 
categories:  soft contracts and hard contracts. A soft contract refers to the existence of implicit, mutual understandings 
of expected roles and behaviors on the part of the exchange parties (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford 1995).  The soft 
contract does not set out specific stipulations since it relies on unstated understandings.  Some think of them as 
incomplete contracts, since large parts of them are unwritten and exist mainly in the understanding of the agreeing 
parties.  Incomplete contracts allow exchange parties to save costs such as costs of searching for information on future 
contingencies or the costs of writing fully contingent contracts (Klein 2002).  However, incomplete contracts may 
leave the parties vulnerable to opportunistic behavior, since it would be possible to exploit unstated or vague 
contractual terms. 
 
Soft contracts are useful when the performance of exchange parties is difficult to measure.  For instance, a 
supplier’s responsiveness to a customer’s urgent request for extra parts cannot be measured easily.  There are several 
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contingencies involved in the responsiveness to urgent requests such as extent of parts stocks, delivery time allowed 
the supplier, the price of the parts, etc.  Thus, it is not feasible or usually possible for exchange parties to specify all 
contingencies with regard to measuring the performance of the supplier.   
 
Supply chain members whose relationship has a long-term orientation may accept short-term disadvantages 
since these may be expected to be balanced out by longer-term advantages (Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990).  Thus, 
as exchange parties in LTO cultures adopt more and more of their national cultures, they are less likely to engage in 
short-term self-interested behavior.  Instead, they are more likely to perceive and value future benefits, so they seek to 
continue the relationship with their partners.  Through the continued relationship, exchange parties have a better 
chance of developing mutual understanding.  Supply chain partners with long-term perspectives tend to build up 
implicit guidelines for behavior through soft contracts.  
 
H1:  In a high LTO culture, the more an exchange party adopts the national culture, the more the party relies on 
soft contracts.  
 
Hard contract refers to detailed contractual agreements that specify at length the roles and obligations of the 
parties (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Smith, Carroll, & Ashford 1995).  Thus, detailed contractual 
obligations, or specific rules and regulations would characterize hard contracts.  For example, a hard contract between 
exchange parties generally spells out in detail the penalties for failure to perform designated tasks.  Therefore, 
exchange parties with hard contracts are constrained to behave in the manner required by a written contract. 
 
Hard contracts may be ineffective in prohibiting exchange parties from seeking self-interest for short-term 
benefits (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Williamson 1991) because the specific rules and regulations of hard 
contracts cannot cover all possible contingencies.  An opportunistic party can take advantage of ambiguous language 
or unforeseen circumstances to increase the party’s own gain from the contract.  Worse still, contract language that 
adequately reflects the current situation may apply less and less precisely as the years pass.  The passage of time thus 
exposes the parties to even more risks of opportunistic behavior. 
 
In LTO cultures, exchange parties with long-term perspectives expect their relationships to continue over a 
long period.  They expect to harvest the benefits on a longer-term base.  Once a relationship ceases, parties lose any 
chance to profit from it.  As dishonesty and opportunistic behavior can terminate relationships, they are avoided--not 
for contractual reasons but for the sake of continuity.  It is continuity, after all, that is regarded as the source of the 
mutual long-term pay-off.  For the high LTO partner, a hard contract cannot guarantee longer-term future benefit.  
Reliance on the mutual commitment to continuity implicit in the soft contract appears more certain to one who is 
acculturated in LTO values.  
 
It is of course possible for an exchange party with LTO to write a hard contract.  Given, however, the fact 
that hard contracts are particularly weak in covering future contingencies and the focus on future outcomes in LTO 
cultures, a hard contract appears unlikely.  Therefore, the more exchange parties show long-term orientation 
tendencies, the less exchange parties would be expected to rely on hard contracts.  
 
H2:  In a high LTO culture, there is no relationship between the level of a party’s adoption of the national 
culture and the party’s reliance on hard contracts.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Context 
 
To test the hypotheses, supply chain relationships between manufacturers and their suppliers in Korea were 
studied.  Korea was selected for two reasons.  First, Korea represents a high LTO culture. Hofstede (1991) ranked 
Korea among the highest cultures on his LTO scale. Second, even though the Korean economy has been developing 
rapidly over the past 30 years, research on supply chain relationships in Korea is rare. Therefore, this study extends 
the understanding of supply chain relationships to Korean firms.   
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Sample  
 
Manufacturers in Korea were selected as a systematic random sample of 465 firms from a mailing list of the Korean 
Manufacturers Association. The manufacturers in this study were drawn from a variety of industries (principally from 
electronics, metal, textile, and steel industries) to enhance the generalizability of the results by minimizing the effect of industry-
specific characteristics. As this research concerns manufacturers’ contractual relationships, the heads of purchasing departments 
of the manufacturing companies were chosen as key informants. Purchasing managers are responsible for securing materials 
from suppliers, hence they can be expected to be knowledgeable about production input sourcing and the attendant appropriate 
supplier relationships (Hutt and Speh 1992).  
 
Each informant was mailed a questionnaire and asked to complete it with respect to a major supplier. After 
callbacks and a second mailing, 101 surveys were collected, yielding response rates of approximately 22%.   
 
The usable responses were tested for nonresponse bias by comparing early respondents with late respondents 
(Armstrong and Overton 1977).  The mean value for each scale (i.e., long-term orientation, soft contract, and hard 
contract), and the characteristics of the participating companies and the key informants (i.e., years of relationship with 
the supplier, years of experiences of the respondents as purchasing managers) were compared across the two groups.  
The comparison results indicated no sign of significant differences between two groups (the p-values for the 
comparisons ranged from .22 to .31 for Korea data.)  In addition, the responding firms were compared with the 
nonresponding firms based on such characteristics as the numbers of employees and total sales, using the secondary 
data obtained from Korean Commercial and Manufacturing Association.  The comparison results produced no 
significant differences.  Finally the response rates across the different industries in the sample (i.e., electronics, metal, 
textile, and steel) revealed no significant difference, suggesting that the data are not skewed by non-response bias.     
 
In the pretest, the respondents were evaluated on their qualifications to respond to the survey questions (e.g., 
Kumar, Stern, and Achrol 1992) based on these criteria:  length of time the firm had dealt with their main supplier, 
duration of tenure in the manager’s present job and perceived level of knowledge concerning their contractual 
relationship with their main supplier.  The pre-test results indicated that the respondent companies had an average 13-
year relationship with their major suppliers and that the respondents had occupied their current positions for 6.4 years 
on average.  The descriptive statistics also suggested that the target sample (i.e., purchasing managers) is qualified to 
answer the survey with sufficient experience with the main supplier and its product.  
 
Measurement Scale Development 
 
The Korean version of questionnaire was translated by the first author whose native tongue is Korean.  To 
make sure that the translated questionnaire was identical in Korean and English, a bi-lingual Korean-English 
colleague back-translated the questionnaire from Korean to English. Several translation differences between two 
translators were identified and resolved after a discussion between two translators.  
 
Measure scale development was carried out in two stages.  First, the existing measures of the focal variables 
were collected from the literature.  Then, in-depth interviews were conducted with three purchasing managers to 
check the relevance of the collected measures.  Wording of some of the items was revised based on the input from the 
purchasing managers.  All items were 7-point Likert-type scales anchored by 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 (strongly 
agree) as endpoints.   
 
LTO culture 
 
This scale captures exchange parties’ perception of their countries’ level of long-term orientation.  These 
responses measure the extent to which exchange parties in the same country had different degrees of personal 
integration of the LTO perspective.  Based on Hofstede’s (1991) original wording, each item was adapted by the first 
author for use in the present context.  The three key components of continuity, thrift and perseverance were captured 
by seven items.  These seven items asked respondents the importance of working toward future goals instead of 
enjoying present pleasures, of working hard today for a better quality of life in the future, of saving money rather than 
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spending it today, of being frugal, of making connection with other people, and of postponing one’s enjoyment of life 
to the future.  
 
With reference to a possible cross-cultural effect on the exchange parties’ behavior, it is usually pointed out 
that there are individual differences in the degree of cultural influence on the behavior of group members (Chen, 
Chen, & Meindl 1998; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Any one member of a high LTO culture might respond to items 
in a manner contrary to the typical member of the culture, reflecting perhaps lower levels of acculturation into the 
larger cultural pattern.   Thus, an exchange party in a high LTO culture could show lower LTO than expected.  In this 
study, the different level of cultural influence on the exchange parties’ behavior is considered. Exchange parties are 
asked their perceptions of the LTO culture of their home country. 
 
Contracts 
 
Contract type was measured so that hard and soft contracts could be distinguished.  Hard contracts were 
characterized by explicit, precise descriptions of each party’s role, responsibilities, legal remedies for performance 
failures and the method of conflict resolution.  Soft contracts were characterized more by the reliance on mutual 
understanding (as opposed to contract stipulations) of each party’s role, responsibilities, remedies for performance 
failures and the way of resolution for conflict.  These items were used by Lusch & Brown (1996). 
 
Construct Validity 
 
Each latent variable – Long-Term Orientation (LTO), Soft Contract (SCONT), Hard Contract (HCONT), 
Buyer Dependence (BUYDEP), and Supplier Dependence (SUPDEP) – that was measured with multiple items was 
subjected to the scale purification procedure.  On the basis of item-to-total correlations, the ill-fitted items were 
dropped. Among the six items used for LTO, the relative importance of the quality of the future (LTO5) and the 
postponing of current enjoyment to the future (LTO6) were deleted since these items lowered internal consistency.   
The subsequent reduced sets of items were subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using LISREL.  Based on 
the CFA results, some of the items with low factor loadings were removed from the scales.  Finally, coefficient alpha 
for each construct was measured for reliability test.  
 
2
(32) 
= 41.48 (p=.13), GFI =.93 AGFI = 0.87,  CFI = .95, RMSEA = .054). All the factor loadings were highly significant 
(p < .01), showing the evidence of convergent validity and unidimsionality of the measures (Anderson and Gerbing 
1988).  
 
Discriminant validity of all the 3 latent variables was checked through 2 Difference Tests: all the constructs 
in pairs (3 tests altogether) were tested if the restricted model (in which the correlation was fixed as one) was 
significantly worse than the freely estimated model (in which the correlated was estimated freely).  All the 2 
differences were highly significant, presenting the evidence of discriminant validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). 
2
(1) = 25.52 (p < .01) for data, suggesting 
these two constructs are distinct.  
 
Finally, the reliability coefficient of each construct was measured (between 0.71 and 0.82). Each factor 
shows satisfactory level of reliability these results show that the measures in this study possess adequate reliability 
and validity. The factor loadings, reliability measures of each construct, and as goodness-of-fit index are reported in 
Table 1.   
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Table 1 
Measurement Items and Validity 
Korea: 2(32) = 41.48 (p=.13), GFI =.93 AGFI = 0.87,  CFI = .95, RMSEA = .054,   
Long-Term Orientation Culture                                                          CR: .71 SFL 
 Korea 
LTO1: working toward future goal             
LTO2: working for future life       
LTO3: saving money for future            
LTO4: being frugal         
LTO5: the relative importance of the quality of the future  
LTO6: the postponing of current enjoyment to the future 
.58 
.81 
.45 
.53 
* 
* 
Soft Contract (SCONT)                                                           CR: .82   
SCONT1: mutual understanding of the roles and responsibility   
SCONT2: mutual understanding of the behavior in case of unplanned event 
SCONT3: mutual understanding of how disagreements will be resolved 
.53 
.80 
.50 
Hard Contract (HCONT)                                                            CR: .79   
HCONT1: precise definition of roles and responsibility in contract   
HCONT2: detailed direction in contract about behavior for unplanned event 
HCONT3: precise contract statement of how disagreements will be resolved 
.73 
.81 
.71 
Note: * Items deleted from further analysis due to low factor loadings or high cross-loadings.  SFL = Standardized Factor 
Loading, CR = Composite Reliability. 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
We include firm size, relationship length, and power-asymmetry between a manufacturer  and its supplier as 
control variables. Firm size was indicated by the logarithm of the number of employees. Relationship length was 
assessed by the number of years that the manufacturer has been doing business with the supplier. Power-asymmetry 
was calculated by the deduction of supplier’s dependence from its buyer’s dependence. 
 
 
Table 2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Constructs 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. LTO (LTO) 1.00      
2. Soft Contract (SCONT)  .21 1.00     
3. Hard Contract (HCONT)  .00 .26 1.00    
4. Power Asymmetry (POWASYM) -.07 -.02 .05 1.00   
5. Company Size (SIZE) -.14 -.04 -.02 -.16 1.00  
6. Relationship Length (LENGTH) .07 .16 -.03 -.08 .00 1.00 
Mean 5.41 5.22 4.68 0.21 4.36 13.13 
Standard Deviation .72 .71 1.35 1.00 1.56 9.34 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses were tested formally with multiple regressions. Four tests were done to verify the hypotheses. 
The first test was for hypotheses 1. The dependent variable in the regression model was soft contract (SOFTC). The 
independent variables included time-orientation of the culture (LTO) and power asymmetry (POWASYM). Power 
asymmetry between exchange parties was added, since the interfirm power relationship might be a factor which 
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influence the adoption of specific contract. The equation was structured as follows: 
 
SOFTC = b0  +  b1 LTO + b2 POWASYM + + b3 FIRMSIZE + b4 LENGTH + ui  
 
Where 
 
b1, b2 ,b3, b4 = coefficient 
ui  = an error term 
    
The second test was done with hard contract (HARDC) for hypothesis 2. The same independent variables used in the 
first test were included.  The results are shown in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3 
Regression Analysis for Hypotheses 
 
                                                                               Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables           SCONT    HCONT 
LTO                          .212    .004  
                          (2.140)a      (.045) 
SIZE         -.018   -.010 
        (-.172)  (-.090) 
LENGTH          .147  -.026 
         (1.482)  (-.254) 
POWASYM                    -.005     .051   
                            (-.055)   (.502) 
Adj. R2                     .067     .010 
 
a : reject Ho at p < .05 (1-tailed test.) 
 
 
The results in Table 3 show that LTO culture in Korea is positively associated with soft contracts ( = .212, p 
 .05). This suggested that as exchange parties in Korea adopt the prevalent national culture (LTO), they are likely to 
rely on soft contracts. This result supports H1. 
 
Similarly, results show that exchange parties in LTO culture do not rely on hard contracts, which supports 
H2. Exchange parties with high long-term orientation culture in Korea do not tend to depend on hard contracts. 
 
Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
 
 Hypothesis testing supports the claim that, as supply chain members adopt LTO characteristics, they will 
tend to favor soft contracts with suppliers.  Further, the data suggest that there is no basis for supposing that Korean 
supply chain members will rely on hard contracts.  The usual expectation and practice in Korea is the soft contract, 
and this expectation is elevated as supply chain members evidence higher levels of LTO acculturation.   
 
 It is interesting to note that, in terms of contract preference, none of the control factors (firm size, length of 
relationship between the parties or inter-organizational power asymmetry) predicted contract type well.  The power of 
the LTO cultural variable in influencing contract preference is unassailable.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Most of the newly developing countries in Asia are characterized by inter-organizational relationships 
peculiar to them (Kale 1986).  It is tempting to conclude that the level of economic development is a significant 
determinant of inter-organizational relationships across cultures globally, such that these relationships everywhere 
might be understood by determining the economic status of the country of interest.  This research shows that such a 
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conclusion is unwarranted.  Instead, the influence of cultural values is of significant importance and may not be 
disregarded when considering these relationships. Cultural factors may be of greater importance, in fact, given the 
elimination of variables like firm size or power asymmetry as important predictors of contract type selection. 
 
This study shows that firms in a high LTO culture tend to prefer and use soft contracts in the relationship 
between supply chain members.  When Korean firms expect their relationships with partners to continue into the 
future, they are likely to develop mutual understanding of expected roles and behaviors.  Since future contingencies 
are difficult to predict, exchange parties develop mutually acceptable behavior standards to deal with future 
contingencies.  It is difficult for exchange parties to deal with uncertain future contingencies with hard contract that 
specify specific behavior (Ford et al 1998).  Thus, exchange parties in Korea are more likely to develop soft contracts 
that facilitate future benefits by permitting adjustments as contingencies arise based on implicit assumptions of mutual 
gain.  
 
Managerial Implications 
 
Western firms with supply chain partners in Asia should be aware that the nature of contract they propose is 
not "culture-neutral."  Soft contracts in LTO countries were evolved from cultural assumptions quite different from 
the motives guiding contract choices on home soil.  When US companies establish manufacturing facilities in East-
Asia, they should both expect and seek to resolve time-orientation issues.  If they want short-term benefits in the 
relationship with local customers or suppliers, they may encounter difficulties due to the mismatch of time orientation.  
Asian firms might feel uncomfortable with US companies that insist on explicit contracts.  An explicit contract may 
be simply "good business" to an American business person while the exchange partner might regard it as proof of 
unwillingness to establish a long-term relationship.  This misunderstanding might jeopardize possible fruitful 
relationships with LTO partners.  
 
Limitations & Future Research 
 
We examined only one dimension of culture, that is, long-term orientation.  The study does not include other 
cultural dimensions such as collectivism, or power distance, risk avoidance, and masculinity (Hofstede 1991).  Among 
the cultural dimensions, collectivism/individualism has shown strong empirical results (Triandis, 1995).  Thus, 
collectivist culture may have a strong influence on exchange parties.  For instance, if a member of a collectivist 
culture asserts self-interest too much, it would be viewed as a challenge to the relationship between members (Chen, 
Chen, & Meindl 1998), since collectivist culture stresses cooperation between members (Wagner 1995).  Thus, 
exchange parties adopting collectivist culture will be less likely to engage in self-serving behavior.  Thus, exchange 
parties tend not to worry about opportunistic behavior on the part of their partners.  Exchange parties in collectivist 
cultures may be expected to rely on soft contracts, certainly more often that their counterparts in individualist cultures 
do.    
 
The other end of the time-orientation spectrum must be investigated.  If high LTO cultures tend to rely on 
soft contracts as a function of their LTO acculturation, would low LTO (i.e. more short-term focused) supply chain 
members be expected to rely on hard contracts in the same way?  There is some indication that this is not the case.  
Macaulay (1963) reports that in most manufacturing situations in Wisconsin, businessmen prefer to rely on ―a man’s 
word‖ in a brief letter and a handshake even when the transaction involves exposure to serious risks.  Thus, 
exploration of the relationship between culture and contract-type needs to be extended carefully since easy analogies 
may not be accurate.   
 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Anderson, Erin and Barton Weitz (1989), Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial Channel 
Dyads, Marketing Science, 8(4): 310-323. 
2. Antia, Kersi and Gary Frazier (2001), The Severity of Contract Enforcement in Interfirm Channel 
Relationship, Journal of Marketing, 65(October): 67-81. 
3. Axelrod, R (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fall 2005                                                               Volume 21, Number 4 
 104 
4. Bacharach, Samuel B. and Edward J. Lawler (1981), Bargaining: Power, Tactics, and outcomes, Jossey-
Bass: San Francisco. 
5. Barkema, Harry and Freek Vermeulen (1997), What Differences in the Cultural Backgrounds of Partners are 
Detrimental for International Joint Ventures? Journal of International Business Studies, 28 (4): 845-864 
6. Bello, Daniel C. and David I. Gilliland (1997), The Effect of Output Controls, Process Controls, and 
Flexibility on Export Channel Performance, Journal of Marketing, 61(January): 22-38. 
7. Buvik, Arnt, Torger Reve (2001), Asymmetrical Deployment of Specific Assets and Contractual 
Safeguarding in Industrial Purchasing Relationships, Journal of Business Research, 51(2): 101-113. 
8. Cadotte, Ernest and Louis Stern (1979), A Process Model of Interorganizational Relations in Marketing 
Channels, in Research in Marketing, Vol. 2 Jagdish Sheth, ed., JAI Press: Greenwich, CT 
9. Cannon, Joseph, Ravi Achrol, and Gregory Gundlach (2000), Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form 
Governance, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 28(2): 180-194 
10. Cartwright, Bliss C., and Schwartz, Richard D.(1973). The invocation of legal norms: an empirical 
investigation of Durkheim and Weber, American Sociological Review, 38: 340-354. 
11. Chang, Juochung and Cherng G. Ding (1995), The Influence of Culture on Industrial Buying Selection 
Criteria in Taiwan and Mainland China, Industrial Marketing Management, 24: 277-284. 
12. Chiles, Todd H. and John F. Mcmackin (1996), Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction 
Cost Economics, Academy of Management Review, 21(1): 73-99. 
13. Doney, Patricia M. and Joseph P. Cannon (1997), An Examination of the Nature of Trust in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships, Journal of Marketing, 61(April): 35-51. 
14. Dore, R (1987), Taking Japan seriously, Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA 
15. Dwyer F. Robert, Paul H. Schurr, and Sejo Oh (1987), Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships Journal of 
Marketing, 51(April): 11-27. 
16. Etger, Michael and Aharon Valency (1983), Determinants of the Use of Contracts in Conventional Marketing 
Channels, Journal of Retailing, 59(Winter): 81-92. 
17. Foa, Uriel and Enna Foa (1974), Societal Structures of the Mind, Charles C. Thomas: Springfield, IL 
18. Ford, David, Lars Gadde, Hakan Hakansson, Anders Lundgren, Ivan Shehota, Peter Turnbull, and David 
Wilson (1998), Relationships and Technology, in David Ford (Ed.), Managing Business Relationships, Wiley 
& Sons Ltd: England.  
19. Frazier, Gary L (1983) Interorganizational Exchange Behavior in Marketing Channels: A Broadened 
Perspective, Journal of Marketing, 47(Fall): 68-78. 
20. Ganesan, Shankar (1994) Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships, Journal of 
Marketing, 58(April): 1-19. 
21. Gudykunst, William B.(1988) Culture and Intergroup Processes, in M. Bond (Ed.), The Cross-Cultural 
Challenge to Social Psychology, Sage Publication: California. 
22. Gundlach, T. Gregory and Ernest R. Cadotte (1993), Exchange Interdependence and Interfirm Interaction: 
Research in a Simulated Channel Setting, Journal of Marketing Research, 31(November): 516-532 
23. Heide, Jan B. and George John (1992), Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationships? Journal of Marketing, 
56(April): 32-44. 
24. Hill, Charles W. (1990) Cooperation, Opportunism, and the Invisible Hand: Implications for Transaction 
Cost Theory Academy of Management Review, 15(3): 500-513. 
25. Hofstede, Geert (1991), Cultures and Organization: Software of the mind, McGraw-Hill London. 
26. Jacobs, Lawrence (1991), Short-Term America, Sage Publication: London. 
27. Kale, Sudhir H. (1986) Dealer Perceptions of Manufacturer Power and Influence Strategy in a Developing 
Country, Journal of Marketing Research, 23(November): 387-393.  
28. Keesing, Roger (1974), Theories of Culture, Annual Review of Anthropology, 3, 73-97. 
29. Klein, Benjamin (2002), The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-enforcing Relationship, in Eric Brousseau 
and Jean-Micael Glachant (Ed.) The Economics of Contracts, Cambridge University Press, England. 
30. Kumar, Nirmalya, Lisa K. Scheer, and Jan-Benedict E. M. Steenkamp (1995), The Effect of  Perceived 
Interdependence on Dealer Attitudes, Journal of Marketing Research, 32(August): 348- 356.  
31. Lawler, Edward J. and Samuel B. Bacharach (1987), Comparison of Dependence and Punitive Forms of 
Power, Social forces, 66(2): 446-462. 
32. Lusch, Robert F. and James R. Brown (1996), Interdependency, Contracting, and Relational Behavior in 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fall 2005                                                               Volume 21, Number 4 
 105 
Marketing Channels, Journal of Marketing, 60(October): 19-38. 
33. Mackneil, Ian R. (1980), The New social Contract, Yale University: New Haven, CT. 
34. Moorman, Christine, Gerald Zaltman, and Rohit Deshpande (1992), Relationship Between Providers and 
Users of Market Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and Between Organizations, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 29(August): 314-328. 
35. Mooij, Marieke De. (1997), Global Marketing and Advertising: Understanding Cultural paradox, Sage 
Publication: London.  
36. Morgan, Robert M and Shelby D. Hunt (1994), The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing, 
Journal of Marketing, 58(July): 20-38. 
37. Nakata, Cheryl and K. Sivakumar (1996), National Culture and New Product Development: An Integrative 
Review, Journal of Marketing, 60(January): 61- 72. 
38. Newman, Karen L. and Stanley D. Nollen (1996), Culture and Congruence: The Fit between Management 
Practices and National Culture, Journal of International Business Studies, 27(4): 753-779. 
39. Noordewier, Thomas G., George john, and John R. Nevin (1990), Performance Outcomes of Purchasing 
Arrangements in Industrial Buyer-Vendor Relationships, Journal of Marketing, 54(October): 108-122. 
40. Ouchi, W. G. (1981), Theory Z, Avon: New York 
41. Provan Keith G. and Steven J. Skinner (1989), Interorganizational Dependence and Control as Predictors of 
Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relations, Academy of management Journal, 32(1): 202-212. 
42. Rokeach, Milton (1973), The Nature of Human Values, The Free Press: New York.  
43. Sheth, Jagdish N., David M. Gardner and Dennis E. Garrett (1988), Marketing Theory: Evolution and 
Evaluation, John Wiley & Sons: New York.  
44. Smith, Ken, G., Stephen J. Carroll, and Susan J. Ashford (1995), Intra- and Interorganizational Cooperation: 
Toward a Research Agenda, Academy of Management Journal 38(1): 7-23. 
45. Williamson, Oliver (1975), Markets and hierarchies, The Free Press: New York.  
46. Williamson, Oliver (1991), Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural 
Alternatives, Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(June): 269-296. 
47. Yeh, Ryh-Song and John J. Lawrence (1995), Individualism and Confucian Dynamism: A Note On 
Hofstede’s Cultural Root To Economic Growth, Journal of International Business Studies, 26(3): 655-669. 
48. Yeung, Irene Y. M. And Rosalie L. Tung (1996), Achieving Business Success in Confucian Societies: The 
Importance of Guanxi (Connection), Organizational Dynamics, 25(2): 54-65. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – Fall 2005                                                               Volume 21, Number 4 
 106 
NOTES 
